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Abstract
We want assurances that sensitive information will not be disclosed
when aggregate data derived from a database is published. Differential privacy offers a strong statistical guarantee that the effect
of the presence of any individual in a database will be negligible, even when an adversary has auxiliary knowledge. Much of the
prior work in this area consists of proving algorithms to be differentially private one at a time; we propose to streamline this process
with a functional language whose type system automatically guarantees differential privacy, allowing the programmer to write complex privacy-safe query programs in a flexible and compositional
way.
The key novelty is the way our type system captures function
sensitivity, a measure of how much a function can magnify the distance between similar inputs: well-typed programs not only can’t
go wrong, they can’t go too far on nearby inputs. Moreover, by introducing a monad for random computations, we can show that the
established definition of differential privacy falls out naturally as
a special case of this soundness principle. We develop examples
including known differentially private algorithms, privacy-aware
variants of standard functional programming idioms, and compositionality principles for differential privacy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.2 [Programming Languages]: Language Classifications—specialized application languages
General Terms
Keywords

Languages

Differential Privacy, Type Systems

1. Introduction
It’s no secret that privacy is a problem. A wealth of information
about individuals is accumulating in various databases — patient
records, content and link graphs of social networking sites, book
and movie ratings, ... — and there are many potentially good uses
to which it could be put. But, as Netflix and others have learned
[26] to their detriment, even when data collectors try to release only
anonymized or aggregated results, it is easy to publish information
that reveals much more than was intended, when cleverly combined
with other data sources. An exciting new body of work on differential privacy [6, 7, 12–15, 27] aims to address this problem by,
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first, replacing the informal goal of ‘not violating privacy’ with a
technically precise and strong statistical guarantee, and then offering various mechanisms for achieving this guarantee. Essentially, a
mechanism for publishing data is differentially private if any conclusion made from the published data is almost exactly as likely if
any one individual’s data is omitted from the database. Methods for
achieving this guarantee can be attractively simple, usually involving taking the true answer to a query and adding enough random
noise to blur the contributions of individuals.
For example, the query “How many patients at this hospital are
over the age of 40?” is intuitively “almost safe”—safe because it
aggregates many individuals’ contributions together, and “almost”
because, if an adversary happened to know the ages of every patient except John Doe, then answering this query would give them
certain knowledge of a fact about John. The differential privacy
methodology rests on the observation that, if we add a small amount
of random noise to its result, we can still get a useful idea of the
true answer to this query while obscuring the contribution of any
single individual. By contrast, the query “How many patients are
over the age of 40 and also happen to be named John Doe?” is
plainly problematic, since it is focused on an individual rather than
an aggregate. Such a query cannot usefully be privatized: if we add
enough noise to obscure any individual’s contribution to the result,
there won’t be any signal left.
So far, most of the work in differential privacy concerns specific
algorithms rather than general, compositional language features.
Although there is already an impressive set of differentially private
versions of particular algorithms [6, 18], each new one requires its
own separate proof. McSherry’s Privacy Integrated Queries (PINQ)
[25] are a good step toward more general principles: they allow for
some relational algebra operations on database tables, as well as
certain forms of composition of queries. But even these are relatively limited. We offer here a higher-order functional programming language whose type system directly embodies reasoning
about differential privacy. In this language, we can implement McSherry’s principles of sequential and parallel composition of differentially private computations, and many others besides, as higherorder functions. This provides a foundational explanation of why
compositions of differentially private mechanisms succeed in the
ways that they do.
The central idea in our type system also appears in PINQ and
in many of the algorithm-by-algorithm proofs in the differential
privacy literature: the sensitivity of query functions to quantitative
differences in their input. Sensitivity is a sort of continuity property;
a function of low sensitivity maps nearby inputs to nearby outputs.
To give precise meaning to ‘nearby,’ we equip every type with a
metric — a notion of distance — on its values.
Sensitivity matters for differential privacy because the amount
of noise required to make a deterministic query differentially private is proportional to that query’s sensitivity. The sensitivity of

both queries discussed above is in fact 1: adding or removing one
patient’s records from the hospital database can only change the
true value of the query by at most 1. This means that we should add
the same amount of noise to “How many patients at this hospital
are over the age of 40?” as to “How many patients are over the age
of 40, who also happen to be named John Doe?” This may appear
counter-intuitive, but actually it is just right: the privacy of single
individuals is protected to exactly the same degree in both cases.
Of course, the usefulness of the results differs: knowing the answer
to the first query with, say, a typical error margin of ±100 could
still be valuable if there are thousands of patients in the hospital’s
records, whereas knowing the answer to the second query (which
can only be zero or one) ±100 is useless. (We might try making the
second query more useful by scaling its answer up numerically: “Is
John Doe over 40? If yes, then 1,000, else 0.” But this query has a
sensitivity of 1,000, not 1, and so 1,000 times as much noise must
be added, blocking our sneaky attempt to violate privacy.)
To track function sensitivity, we give a distance-aware type system. This type system embodies two important connections between differential privacy and concepts from logic and type theory. First, reasoning about sensitivity itself strongly resembles linear logic [4, 16], which has been widely applied in programming
languages. The essential intuition about linear logic and linear type
theories is that they treat assumptions as consumable resources. We
will see that in our setting the capability to sensitively depend on an
input’s value behaves like a resource. This intuition recurs throughout the paper, and we sometimes refer to sensitivity to an input as
if it is counting the number of “uses” of that input.
The other connection comes from the use of a monad to internalize the operation of adding random noise to query results. We
include in the programming language a monad for random computations, similar to previously proposed stochastic calculi [29, 30].
Since every type has a metric in our setting, we are led to ask: what
should the metric be for the monad? We find that, with the right
choice of metric, the definition of differentially private functions
falls out as a special case of the definition of function sensitivity
for functions, when the function output happens to be monadic.
This observation is very useful: while prior work treats differential privacy mechanisms and private queries as separate things, we
see here that they can be unified in a single language. Our type
system can express the privacy-safety of individual queries, as well
as more complex query protocols (see Section 5) that repeatedly interact with a private database, adjusting which queries they perform
depending on the responses they receive.
To briefly foreshadow what a query in our language looks like,
suppose that we have the following functions available:
over 40 : row → bool
size : db ⊸ R
filter : (row → bool) → db ⊸ db
add noise : R ⊸ #R
The predicate over 40 simply determines whether or not an individual database row indicates that patient is over the age of 40.
The function size takes an entire database, and outputs how many
rows it contains. Its type uses a special arrow ⊸, related to the linear logic function type of the same name, which expresses that the
function has sensitivity of 1. The higher-order function filter takes
a predicate on database rows and a database; it returns the subset
of the rows in the database that satisfy the predicate. This filtering
operation also has a sensitivity of 1 in its database argument, and
again ⊸ is used in its type. Finally, the function add noise is the
differential privacy mechanism that takes a real number as input
and returns a random computation (indicated by the monad #) that
adds in a bit of random noise. This function also has a sensitivity

of 1, and this fact is intimately connected to privacy properties, as
explained in Section 4.
With these in place, the query can be written as the program
λd : db. add noise (filter over 40 d) : db ⊸ #R.
As we explain in Section 4, its type indicates that it is a differentially private computation taking a database and producing a real
number. Its runtime behavior is to yield a privacy-preserving noised
count of the number of patients in the hospital that are over 40.
We begin in Section 2 by describing a core type system that
tracks function sensitivity. We state an informal version of the key
metric preservation theorem, which says the execution of every
well-typed function reflects the sensitivity that the type system assigns it. Section 3 gives examples of programs that can be implemented in our language. Section 4 shows how to add the probability
monad, and Section 5 develops further examples. In Section 6 we
state the standard safety properties of the type system, give a formal
statement of the metric preservation theorem, and sketch its proof.
The remaining sections discuss related work and offer concluding
remarks.

2. A Type System for Function Sensitivity
2.1 Sensitivity
Our point of departure for designing a programming language for
differential privacy is function sensitivity. A function is said to be csensitive (or have sensitivity c) if it can magnify distances between
inputs by a factor of at most c. Since this definition depends on the
input and output types of the function having a metric (a notion of
distance) defined on them, we begin by discussing a special case
of the definition for functions from R to R, where we can use the
familiar Euclidean metric dR (x, y) = |x − y| on the real line. We
can then formally define c-sensitivity for real-valued functions as
follows.
Definition A function f : R → R is said to be c-sensitive iff
dR (f (x), f (y)) ≤ c · dR (x, y) for all x, y ∈ R.
A special case of this definition that comes up frequently is the
case where c = 1. A 1-sensitive function is also called a nonexpansive function, since it keeps distances between input points the
same or else makes them smaller. Some examples of 1-sensitive
functions are
f1 (x) = x

f2 (x) = −x

f4 (x) = |x|

f3 (x) = x/2

f5 (x) = (x + |x|)/2

and some non-examples include: f6 (x) = 2x and f7 (x) = x2 . The
function f6 , while not 1-sensitive, is 2-sensitive. On the other hand,
f7 is not c-sensitive for any c.
P ROPOSITION 2.1. Every function that is c-sensitive is also c′ sensitive for every c′ ≥ c.
For example, f3 is both 1/2-sensitive and 1-sensitive.
So far we only have one type, R, with an associated metric.
We would like to introduce other base types, and type operators to
build new types from old ones. We require that for every type τ
that we discuss, there is a metric dτ (x, y) for values x, y ∈ τ . This
requirement makes it possible to straightforwardly generalize the
definition of c-sensitivity to arbitrary types.
Definition A function f : τ1 → τ2 is said to be c-sensitive iff
dτ2 (f (x), f (y)) ≤ c · dτ1 (x, y) for all x, y ∈ τ1 .
The remainder of this subsection introduces several type operators, one after another, with examples of c-sensitive functions

on the types that they express. We use suggestive programminglanguage terminology and notation, but emphasize that the discussion for now is essentially about pure mathematical functions —
we do not yet worry about computational issues such as the possibility of nontermination. For example, we speak of values of a type
in a way that should be understood as more or less synonymous
with mere elements of a set — in Section 2.2 below, we will show
how to actually speak formally about types and values.
First of all, when τ is a type with associated metric dτ , let !r τ
be the type whose values are the same as those of τ , but with the
metric ‘scaled up’ by a factor of r. That is, we define
d!r τ (x, y) = r · dτ (x, y).
One role of this type operator is to allow us to reduce the concept
of c-sensitivity to 1-sensitivity. For we have
P ROPOSITION 2.2. A function f is a c-sensitive function in τ1 →
τ2 if and only f it is a 1-sensitive function in !c τ1 → τ2 .
Proof Let x, y : τ1 be given. Suppose dτ1 (x, y) = r. Then
d!c τ1 (x,y) = cr. For f to be c-sensitive as a function τ1 → τ2
we must have dτ2 (f (x), f (y)) ≤ cr, but this is exactly the same
condition that must be satisfied for f to be a 1-sensitive function
!c τ1 → τ2 .
We can see therefore that f6 is a 1-sensitive function !2 R → R,
and also in fact a 1-sensitive function R → !1/2 R. The symbol
! is borrowed from linear logic, where it indicates that a resource
can be used an unlimited number of times. In our setting an input of
type !r τ is analogous to a resource that can be used at most r times.
We can also speak of !∞ , which scales up all non-zero distances to
infinity, which is then like the original linear logic !, which allows
unrestricted use.
Another way we can consider building up new metric-carrying
types from existing ones is by forming products. If τ1 and τ2 are
types with associated metrics dτ1 and dτ2 , then let τ1 ⊗ τ2 be the
type whose values are pairs (v1 , v2 ) where v1 ∈ τ1 and v2 ∈ τ2 .
In the metric on this product type, we define the distance between
two pairs to be the sum of the distances between each pair of
components:
dτ1 ⊗τ2 ((v1 , v2 ), (v1′ , v2 )) = dτ1 (v1 , v1′ ) + dτ2 (v2 , v2′ )
With this type operator we can describe more arithmetic operations on real numbers. For instance,
f8 (x, y) = x + y

f9 (x, y) = x − y

are 1-sensitive functions in R ⊗ R → R, and
f10 (x, y) = (x, y)
f12 (x, y) = (x + y, 0)

f11 (x, y) = (y, x)
(
(x, y) if x < y
cswp(x, y) =
(y, x) otherwise

are 1-sensitive functions in R ⊗ R → R ⊗ R. We will see the
usefulness of cswp in particular below in Section 3.6. However,
f13 (x, y) = (x · y, 0)

f14 (x, y) = (x, x)

are not 1-sensitive functions in R⊗R → R⊗R. The function f14 is
of particular interest, since at no point do we ever risk multiplying
x by a constant greater than 1 (as we do in, say, f6 and f13 ) and
yet the fact that x is used twice means that variation of x in the
input is effectively doubled in measurable variation of the output.
This intuition about counting uses of variables is reflected in the
connection between our type system and linear logic.
This metric is not the only one that we can assign to pairs.
Just as linear logic has more than one conjunction, our type theory
admits more than one product type. Another one that will prove
useful is taking distance between pairs to be the maximum of

the differences between their components instead the sum. Even
though the underlying set of values is essentially the same, we
regard choosing a different metric as creating a distinct type: the
type τ1 & τ2 consists of pairs hv1 , v2 i, (written differently from
pairs of type τ1 ⊗ τ2 to further emphasize the difference) with the
metric
dτ1 &τ2 (hv1 , v2 i, hv1′ , v2 i) = max(dτ1 (v1 , v1′ ), dτ2 (v2 , v2′ )).
Now we can say that f15 (x, y) = hx, xi is a 1-sensitive function
R ⊗ R → R & R. More generally, & lets us combine outputs
of different c-sensitive functions even if they share dependency on
common inputs.
P ROPOSITION 2.3. If f : τ → τ1 and g : τ → τ2 are c-sensitive,
then λx.hf x, g xi is a c-sensitive function in τ → τ1 & τ2 .
Next we would like to capture the set of functions itself as a
type, so that we can, for instance, talk about higher-order functions.
Let us take τ1 ⊸ τ2 to be the type whose values are 1-sensitive
functions f : τ1 → τ2 . We have already established that the
presence of !r means that having 1-sensitive functions suffices to
express c-sensitive functions for all c, so we need not specially
define an entire family of c-sensitive function type constructors:
the type of c-sensitive functions from τ1 to τ2 is just !c τ1 ⊸ τ2 .
We define the metric for ⊸ as follows:
dτ1 ⊸τ2 (f, f ′ ) = max dτ2 (f (x), f ′ (x))
x∈τ1

This is chosen to ensure that ⊸ and ⊗ have the expected currying/uncurrying behavior with respect to each other. We find in fact
that
curry(f ) = λx.λy.f (x, y)
uncurry(g) = λ(x, y).g x y
are 1-sensitive functions in (R ⊗ R ⊸ R) → (R ⊸ R ⊸ R) and
(R ⊸ R ⊸ R) → (R ⊗ R ⊸ R), respectively.
We postulate several more type operators that are quite familiar
from programming languages. The unit type 1 which has only one
inhabitant (), has the metric d1 ((), ()) = 0. Given two types τ1
and τ2 , we can form their disjoint union τ1 + τ2 , whose values are
either of the form inj1 v where v ∈ τ1 , or inj2 v where v ∈ τ2 . Its
metric is
8
′
′
′
>
<dτ1 (v0 , v0 ) if v = inj1 v0 and v = inj1 v0 ;
′
′
′
dτ1 +τ2 (v, v ) = dτ2 (v0 , v0 ) if v = inj2 v0 and v = inj2 v0′ ;
>
:∞
otherwise.

Note that this definition creates a type that is an extremely disjoint
union of two components. Any distances between pairs of points
within the same component take the distance that that component
specifies, but distances from one component to the other are all
infinite.
Notice what this means for the type bool in particular, which
we define as usual as 1 + 1. It is easy to write c-sensitive functions
from bool to other types, for the infinite distance between the values
true and false licenses us to map them to any two values we like,
no matter how far apart they are. However, it is conversely hard
for a nontrivial function to bool to be c-sensitive. The function
gtzero : R → bool, which returns true when the input is greater
than zero, is not c-sensitive for any finite c. This can be blamed,
intuitively, on the discontinuity of gtzero at zero.
Finally, we include the ability to form (iso)recursive types
µα.τ whose values are of the form fold v, where v is of the type
[µα.τ /α]τ , and whose metric we would like to give as
dµα.τ (fold v, fold v ′ ) = d[µα.τ /α]τ (v, v ′ ).
This definition, however, is not well-founded, since it depends on
a metric at possibly a more complex type, due to the substitution

[µα.τ /α]τ . It will suffice as an intuition for our present informal
discussion, since we only want to use it to talk about lists (rather
than, say, types such as µα.α), but a formally correct treatment of
the metric is given in Section 6.1.
With these pieces in place, we can introduce a type of lists of
real numbers, listreal = µα.1 + R ⊗ α. (The reader is invited to
consider also the alternative where ⊗ is replaced by &; we return
to this choice below in Section 3.) The metric between lists that
arises from the preceding definitions is as follows. Two lists of
different lengths are at distance ∞ from each other; this comes
from the definition of the metric on disjoint union types. For two
lists [x1 , . . . , xn ] and [y1 , . . . , yn ] of the same length, we have
dlistreal ([x1 , . . . , xn ], [y1 , . . . , yn ]) =

n
X

|xi − yi |.

i=1

We now claim that there is a 1-sensitive function sort :
listreal ⊸ listreal that takes in a list of reals and outputs the sorted
version of that same list. This fact may seem somewhat surprising,
since a small variation in the input list can lead to an abrupt change
in the permutation of the list that is produced. However, what we
output is not the permutation itself, but merely the values of the
sorted list; the apparent point of discontinuity where one value
overtakes another is exactly where those two values are equal, and
their exchange of positions in the output list is unobservable.
Of course, we would prefer not to rely on such informal arguments. So let us turn next to designing a rigorous type system
to capture sensitivity of programs, so that we can see that the 1sensitivity of sorting is a consequence of the fact that an implementation of a sorting program is well-typed.
2.2 Typing Judgment
Type safety for a programming language ordinarily guarantees that
a well-typed open expression e of type τ is well-behaved during
execution. ‘Well-behaved’ is usually taken to mean that e can
accept any (appropriately typed) value for its free variables, and
will evaluate to a value of type τ without becoming stuck or causing
runtime errors: Well-typed programs can’t go wrong. We mean to
make a strictly stronger guarantee than this, namely a guarantee
of c-sensitivity. It should be the case that if an expression is given
similar input values for its free variables, the result of evaluation
will also be suitably close—i.e., Well-typed programs can’t go too
far. To this end, we take, as usual, a typing judgment Γ ⊢ e : τ
(expressing that e is a well-formed expression of type τ in a context
Γ) but we add further structure the contexts. By doing so we are
essentially generalizing c-sensitivity to capture what it means for an
expression to be sensitive to many inputs simultaneously — that is,
to all of the variables in the context — rather than just one. Contexts
Γ have the syntax
Γ

::=

· | Γ, x :r τ

for r ∈ R>0 ∪{∞}. To have a hypothesis x :r τ while constructing
an expression e is to have permission to be r-sensitive to variation
in the input x: the output of e is allowed to vary by rs if the value
substituted for x varies by s. We include the special value ∞ as an
allowed value of r so that we can express ordinary (unconstrained
by sensitivity) functions as well as c-sensitive functions. Algebraic
operations involving ∞ are defined by setting ∞ · r = ∞ (except
for ∞ · 0 = 0) and ∞ + r = ∞. This means that to be ∞-sensitive
is no constraint at all: if we consider the definition of sensitivity,
then ∞-sensitivity permits any variation at all in the input to be
blown up to arbitrary variation in the output.
A well-typed expression x :c τ1 ⊢ e : τ2 is exactly a program
that represents a c-sensitive computation. However, we can also
consider more general programs x1 :r1 τ1 , . . . , xn :rn τn ⊢ e : τ
in which case the guarantee is that, if each xi varies by si , then the

P
result of evaluating e only varies by i ri si . More carefully, we
state the following metric preservation theorem for the type system, which is of central importance. The notation [v/x]e indicates
substitution of the value v for the variable x in expression e as
usual.
T HEOREM 2.4 (Metric Preservation). Suppose Γ ⊢ e : τ . Let
sequences of values (vi )1≤i≤n and (vi′ )1≤i≤n be given. Suppose
for all i ∈ 1, . . . , n that we have
1. ⊢ vi , vi′ : τi
2. dτi (vi , vi′ ) = si
3. xi :ri τi ∈ Γ.
If the program [v1 /x1 ] · · · [vn /xn ]e evaluates to v, then there exists
a v ′ such that [v1′ /x1 ] · · · [vn′ /xn ]e evaluates to v ′ , and
X
r i si .
dτ (v, v ′ ) ≤
i

We give a more precise version of this result in Section 6.
2.3 Types

The complete syntax and formation rules for types are given in
Figure 1. Essentially all of these types have already been mentioned
in Section 2.1. There are type variables α, (which appear in type
variable contexts Ψ) base types b (drawn from a signature Σ), unit
and void and sum types, metric-scaled types !r τ , and recursive
types µα.τ . There are the two pair types ⊗ and &, which differ
in their metrics. There are two kinds of function space, ⊸ and →,
where τ1 ⊸ τ2 contains just 1-sensitive functions, while τ1 → τ2
is the ordinary unrestricted function space, containing the functions
that can be programmed without any sensitivity requirements on
the argument. As in linear logic, there is an encoding of τ1 → τ2 ,
in our case as !∞ τ1 ⊸ τ2 , but it is convenient to have the builtin type constructor → to avoid having to frequently introduce and
eliminate !-typed expressions.
2.4 Expressions
The syntax of expressions is straightforward; indeed, our language
can be seen as essentially just a refinement type system layered
over the static and dynamic semantics of an ordinary typed functional programming language. Almost all of the expression formers
should be entirely familiar. One feature worth noting (which is also
familiar from linear type systems) is that we distinguish two kinds
of pairs: the one that arises from ⊗, which is eliminated by patternmatching and written with (parentheses), and the one that arises
from &, which is eliminated by projection and written with hangle
bracketsi. The other is that for clarity we have explicit introduction
and elimination forms for the type constructor !r .
e

::=

x | c | () | he, ei | (e, e)
let(x, y) = e in e | πi e | λx.e | e e |
inji e | (case e of x.e | x.e) |
!e | let !x = e in e |
unfoldτ e | foldτ e

Just as with base types, we allow for primitive constants c to be
drawn from a signature Σ.
2.5 Typing Relation
To present the typing relation, we need a few algebraic operations
on contexts. The notation sΓ indicates pointwise scalar multiplication of all the sensitivity annotations in Γ by s. We can also define
addition of two contexts (which may share some variables) by
·+·=·
(Γ, x :s τ ) + (∆, x :r τ ) = (Γ + ∆), x :r+s τ
(Γ, x :r τ ) + ∆ = (Γ + ∆), x :r τ
Γ + (∆, x :r τ ) = (Γ + ∆), x :r τ

(x 6∈ ∆)
(x 6∈ Γ)

τ ::= α | b | 1 | µα.τ | τ + τ | τ ⊗ τ | τ & τ | τ ⊸ τ | τ → τ | !r τ

Ψ ⊢ 1 : type

Ψ ⊢ µα.τ : type

b : type ∈ Σ
Ψ ⊢ b : type
Ψ ⊢ τ1 : type

Ψ ⊢ τ2 : type

e ֒→ (v1 , v2 )

⋆ ∈ {+, &, ⊗, ⊸, →}

Figure 1. Type Formation

inji e ֒→ inji v

e ֒→ inji v

Γ ⊢ e2 : τ2

var

e ֒→ v

unfold e ֒→ v

!e ֒→ !v

e ֒→ v

[v/x]ei ֒→ v′

e ֒→ !v

fold e ֒→ fold v
τ

τ

[v/x]e′ ֒→ e′

let !x = e in e′ ֒→ v′

⊗E

∆ + rΓ ⊢ let(x, y) = e in e′ : τ ′
Γ ⊢ e2 : τ2

Γ ⊢ e : τ1 & τ2

&I

Γ ⊢ he1 , e2 i : τ1 & τ2

&E

Γ ⊢ πi e : τi
∆, x :r τ1 ⊢ e1 : τ ′
∆, x :r τ2 ⊢ e2 : τ ′

Γ ⊢ e : τ1 + τ2

∆ + rΓ ⊢ case e of x.e1 | x.e2 : τ ′
Γ ⊢ e : τi

∆ ⊢ e1 : τ ⊸ τ ′

Γ ⊢ λx.e : τ ⊸ τ ′

Γ ⊢ e2 : τ

∆ + Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : τ ′
∆ ⊢ e1 : τ → τ ′

+E

Γ, x :1 τ ⊢ e : τ ′

+I

Γ ⊢ inji e : τ1 + τ2

⊸E

Γ ⊢ λx.e : τ → τ ′

→I

Γ⊢e:τ
!I

→E
sΓ ⊢ !e : !s τ

Γ ⊢ e : [µα.τ /α]τ

∆, x :rs τ ⊢ e′ : τ ′

∆ + rΓ ⊢ let !x = e in e′ : τ ′

⊸I

Γ, x :∞ τ ⊢ e : τ ′

Γ ⊢ e2 : τ

∆ + ∞Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : τ ′

µI

!E

Γ ⊢ fold e : τ
µα.τ

Γ⊢e:τ
µE
Γ ⊢ unfold e : [µα.τ /α]τ
µα.τ

Figure 2. Typing Rules
The typing relation is defined by the inference rules in Figure 2.
Every occurrence of r and s in the typing rules is assumed to be
drawn from R>0 ∪ {∞}. Type-checking is decidable; see Section 6
and the appendix1 for more details. In short, the only novelty is that
lower bounds on the annotations in the context are inferred topdown from the leaves to the root of the derivation tree.
The rule var allows a variable from the context to be used as
long as its annotation is at least 1, since the identity function is csensitive for any c ≥ 1 (cf. Proposition 2.1). Any other context Γ
is allowed to appear in a use of var, because permission to depend
on a variable is not an obligation to depend on it. (In this respect
our type system is closer to affine logic than linear logic.)
1 Available

πi e ֒→ vi

Figure 3. Evaluation Rules

∆, x :r τ1 , y :r τ2 ⊢ e′ : τ ′

Γ ⊢ e : τ1 ⊗ τ2

Γ ⊢ e : !s τ

τ

e ֒→ hv1 , v2 i

∆ + Γ ⊢ (e1 , e2 ) : τ1 ⊗ τ2

Γ, x :r τ ⊢ x : τ

Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1

⊗I

′

case e of x.e1 | x.e2 ֒→ v′

e ֒→ fold v
τ

∆ ⊢ e1 : τ1

[v1 /x][v2 /y]e′ ֒→ v′

let(x, y) = e in e ֒→ v
e ֒→ v

e2 ֒→ v2

(e1 , e2 ) ֒→ (v1 , v2 )

′

Ψ ⊢ τ1 ⋆ τ2 : type

r≥1

e1 ֒→ v1

e2 ֒→ v2

he1 , e2 i ֒→ hv1 , v2 i

Ψ ⊢ !r τ : type

() ֒→ ()

e1 e2 ֒→ v′

e1 ֒→ v1

r ∈ R>0 ∪ {∞}

Ψ ⊢ τ : type

[v/x]e ֒→ v′

e2 ֒→ v

λx.e ֒→ λx.e

Ψ, α : type ⊢ τ : type
Ψ, α : type ⊢ α : type

e1 ֒→ λx.e
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In the rule ⊗I, consider the role of the contexts. Γ represents
the variables that e1 depends on, and captures quantitatively how
sensitive it is to each one. ∆ does the same for e2 . In the conclusion
of the rule, we add together the sensitivities found in Γ and ∆,
precisely because the distances in the type τ1 ⊗ τ2 are measured by
a sum of how much e1 and e2 vary. Compare this to &I, where we
merely require that the same context is provided in the conclusion
as is used to type the two components of the pair.
We can see the action of the type constructor !r in its introduction rule. If we scale up the metric on the expression being constructed, then we must scale up the sensitivity of every variable in
its context to compensate.
The closed-scope elimination rules for ⊗, +, and ! share a
common pattern. The overall elimination has a choice as to how
much it depends on the expression of the type being eliminated: this
is written as the number r in all three rules. The cost of this choice
is that context Γ that was used to build that expression must then
be multiplied by r. The payoff is that the variable(s) that appear in
the scope of the elimination (in the case of ⊗E, the two variables x
and y, in +E the xs one in each branch) come with permission for
the body to be r-sensitive to them. In the case of !E, however, the
variable appears with an annotation of rs rather than r, reflecting
that the !s scaled the metric for that variable by a factor of s.
We note that ⊸I, since ⊸ is meant to capture 1-sensitive
functions, appropriately creates a variable in the context with an
annotation of 1. Compare this to →I, which adds a hypothesis
with annotation ∞, whose use is unrestricted. Conversely, in →E,
note that the context Γ used to construct the argument e2 of the
function is multiplied by ∞ in the conclusion. Because the function
e1 makes no guarantee how sensitive it is to its argument, we can in
turn make no guarantee how much e1 e2 depends on the variables in
Γ. This plays the same role as requirements familiar in linear logic,
that the argument to an unrestricted implication cannot depend on
linear resources.
2.6 Evaluation
We give a big-step operational semantics for this language, which is
entirely routine. Values, the subset of expressions that are allowed
as results of evaluation, are defined as follows.
v

::=

() | hv, vi | (v, v) | λx.e | inji v | foldτ v | !v

The judgment e ֒→ v says that e evaluates to v. The complete
set of evaluation rules is given in Figure 3.

3. Examples
We now present some more sophisticated examples of programs
that can be written in this language. We continue to introduce
new base types and new constants as they become relevant. For
readability, we use syntactic sugar for case analysis and pattern
matching á la ML.
3.1 Fixpoint Combinator

Again, every bound variable is used once, except for f , which
is provided as an unrestricted argument, making its repeated use
acceptable. The fact that the initializer to the fold (of type σ)
together with the list to be folded over (of type τ list) occur to
the left of a ⊸ is essential, capturing the fact that variation in the
initializer and in every list element can jointly affect the result.
Binary and iterated concatenation are also straightforwardly
implemented:
@ : τ list ⊗ τ list ⊸ τ list
@ ([ ], x) = x
@ (h :: tl, x) = h :: @ (tl, x)

Because we have general recursive types, we can simulate a fixpoint combinator in pretty much the usual way: we just need to be
a little careful about how sensitivity interacts with fixpoints.
Let τ0 = µα.α → (τ ⊸ σ). Then the expression
Y

=

concat : τ list list ⊸ τ list
concat [ ] = [ ]
concat (h :: tl) = @ (h, concat tl)

λf.(λx.λa.f ((unfoldτ0 x) x) a)
(foldτ0 (λx.λa.f ((unfoldτ0 x) x) a))

has type ((τ ⊸ σ) → (τ ⊸ σ)) → (τ ⊸ σ). This is the
standard call-by-value fixed point operator (differing from the more
familiar Y combinator by the two λa · · · a eta-expansions). It is
easy to check that the unfolding rule
f (Y f ) v ֒→ v0
Y f v ֒→ v0
is admissible whenever f is a function value λx.e.
We could alternatively add a fixpoint operator fixf.e to the
language directly, with the following typing rule:
Γ, f :∞ τ ⊸ σ ⊢ e : τ ⊸ σ
∞Γ ⊢ fixf.e : τ ⊸ σ
This rule reflects the type we assigned to Y above: uses of fix can
soundly be compiled away by defining fixf.e = Y (λf.e). The
fact that f is added to the context annotated ∞ means that we
are allowed to call the recursive function an unrestricted number
of times within e. The context Γ must be multiplied by ∞ in the
conclusion because we can’t (because of the fixpoint), establish any
bound on how sensitive the overall function is from just one call to
it. In the rest of the examples, we write recursive functions in the
usual high-level form, eliding the translation in terms of Y .
3.2 Lists

If we define the natural numbers as usual by
nat = µα.1 + α
z = foldnat inj1 ()
s x = foldnat inj2 x
then we can implement a function that finds the length of a list as
follows:
length : τ list ⊸ nat
length [ ] = z
length (h :: tl) = s (length tl)
However, this implementation is less than ideal, for it ‘consumes’ the entire list in producing its answer, leaving further computations unable to depend on it. We can instead write
length : τ list ⊸ τ list ⊗nat
length [ ] = ([ ], z)
length (h :: tl) = let(tl′ , ℓ) = length tl in(h :: tl′ , s ℓ)
which deconstructs the list enough to determine its length, but
builds up and returns a fresh copy that can be used for further processing. Consider why this function is well-typed: as it decomposes
the input list into h and tl, the value of h is only used once, by including it in the output. Also, tl is only used once, as it is passed
to the recursive call, which is able to return a reconstructed copy
tl′ , which is then included in the output. At no point is any data
duplicated, but only consumed and reconstructed.

We can define the type of lists with elements in τ as follows:
τ list = µα.1 + τ ⊗ α
We write [ ] for the nil value foldτ list inj1 () and h :: tl for
foldτ list inj2 (h, tl), and we use common list notations such as
[a, b, c] for a :: b :: c :: [ ]. Given this, it is straightforward to
program map in the usual way.
map : (τ ⊸ σ) → (τ list ⊸ σ list)
map f [ ] = [ ]
map f (h :: tl) = (f h) :: map f tl
The type assigned to map reflects that a nonexpansive function
mapped over a list yields a nonexpansive function on lists. Every
bound variable is used exactly once, with the exception of f ; this is
permissible since f appears in the context during the typechecking
of map with an ∞ annotation.
Similarly, we can write the usual fold combinators over lists:
foldl : (τ ⊗ σ ⊸ σ) → (σ ⊗ τ list) ⊸ σ
foldl f (init, [ ]) = init
foldl f (init, (h :: tl)) = foldl f (f (h, init), tl)
foldr : (τ ⊗ σ ⊸ σ) → (σ ⊗ τ list) ⊸ σ
foldr f (init, [ ]) = init
foldr f (init, (h :: tl)) = f (h, foldr f (init, tl))

3.3 &-lists
Another definition of lists uses & instead of ⊗: we can say τ alist =
µα.1 + τ & α. (the ‘a’ in alist is for ‘ampersand’). To distinguish
these lists visually from the earlier definition, we write Nil for
foldτ alist inj1 () and Cons p for foldτ list inj2 p.
Recall that & is eliminated by projection rather than patternmatching. This forces certain programs over lists to be implemented in different ways. We can still implement map for this kind
of list without much trouble.
amap : (τ ⊸ σ) → (τ alist ⊸ σ alist)
amap f Nil = Nil
amap f (Cons p) = Conshf (π1 p), map f (π2 p)i
This function is well-typed (despite the apparent double use of
p in the last line!) because the &I rule allows the two components
of an &-pair to use the same context. This makes sense, because
the eventual fate of an &-pair is to have one or the other of its
components be projected out.
The fold operations are more interesting. Consider a naı̈ve implementation of foldl for alist
afoldl : (τ & σ ⊸ σ) → (σ & τ alist) ⊸ σ alist
afoldl f p = case π2 p of x. π1 p
| x. afoldl f hf hπ1 x, π1 pi, π2 xi

where we have replaced ⊗ with & everywhere in foldl’s type to
get the type of afoldl. This program is not well-typed, because π1 p
is still used in each branch of the case despite the fact that π2 p is
case-analyzed. The +E rule sums together these uses, so the result
has sensitivity 2, while afoldl is supposed to be only 1-sensitive to
its argument of type σ & τ alist.
We would like to case-analyze the structure of the second component of that pair, the τ alist, without effectively consuming the
first component. The existing type system does not permit this, but
we can soundly add a primitive2
analyze : σ & (τ1 + τ2 ) ⊸ (σ & τ1 ) + (σ & τ2 )
that gives us the extra bit that we need. The operational behavior
of analyze is simple: given a pair value hv, inji v ′ i with v : σ
and v ′ : τi , it returns inji hv, v ′ i. With this primitive, a well-typed
implementation of afoldl can be given as follows:
unf : (σ & τ alist) ⊸ (σ & (1 + τ & τ alist))
unf p = hπ1 p, unfoldτ alist π2 pi
afoldl : (τ & σ ⊸ σ) → (σ & τ alist) ⊸ σ alist
afoldl f p = case analyze (unf p) of
x : (σ & 1). π1 x
| x : (σ & (τ & τ alist)). afoldl f hf hπ1 π2 x, π1 xi, π2 π2 xi
3.4 Sets
Another useful collection type is finite sets. We posit that τ set is a
type for any type τ , with the metric on it being the Hamming metric
dτ set (S1 , S2 ) = ||S1 △ S2 ||
where △ indicates symmetric difference of sets, and ||S|| the cardinality of the set S; the distance between two sets is the number
of elements that are in one set but not the other.
Note that there is no obvious way to implement this type of sets
in terms of the list types just presented, for the metric is different:
two sets of different size are a finite distance from one another, but
two lists of different size are infinitely far apart.
Primitives that can be added for this type include
size : τ set ⊸ R
setfilter : (τ → bool) → τ set ⊸ τ set
setmap : (σ → τ ) → τ → σ set ⊸ τ set
∩, ∪, \ : τ set ⊗ τ set ⊸ τ set
split : (τ → bool) → τ set ⊸ τ set ⊗ τ set
where size returns the cardinality of a set, ∩ returns the intersection
of two sets, ∪ their union, and \ the difference. Notably, for these
last three primitives, we could not have given them the type τ set &
τ set ⊸ τ set. To see why, consider {b} ∪ {c, d} = {b, c, d}
and {a} ∪ {c, d, e} = {a, c, d, e}. We have d({b}, {a}) = 2
and d({c, d}, {c, d, e}) = 1 on the two inputs to ∪, but on the
output d({b, c, d}, {a, c, d, e}) = 3, and 3 is strictly larger than
max(2, 1). The functions setfilter and setmap work mostly as expected, but with a proviso concerning termination below in Section 3.5.
We note that size is a special case of a more basic summation
primitive:
sum : (τ → R) → τ set ⊸ R

P
The expression sum f S returns s∈S clip(f (s)), where clip(x)
returns x clipped to the interval [−1, 1] if necessary. This clipping
is required for sum to be 1-sensitive in its set argument. Otherwise,
an individual set element could affect the sum by an unbounded
amount. We can then define size S = sum (λx.1) S.
The operation split takes a predicate on τ , and a set; it yields
two sets, one containing the elements of the original set that satisfy
the predicate and the other containing all the elements that don’t.
Notice that split is 1-sensitive in its set argument; this is because if
an element is added to or removed from that set, it can only affect
one of the two output sets, not both.
By using split repeatedly, we can write programs that, given
a set of points in R, computes a histogram, a list of counts indicating how many points are in each of many intervals. For
a simple example, suppose our histogram bins are the intervals
(−∞, 0], (0, 10], . . . , (90, 100], (100, ∞).
hist′ : R → R set ⊸ R set list
hist′ c s = if c ≥ 101 then [s] else
let(y, n) = split(λz.c ≥ z) in
y :: hist′ (c + 10) n
hist : R set ⊸ R list
hist s = map size (hist′ 0 s)
Here we are also assuming the use of ordinary distanceinsensitive arithmetic operations such as ≥ : R → R → bool
and + : R → R → R. We see in the next section that comparison
operators like ≥ cannot be so straightforwardly generalized to be
distance sensitive.
3.5 Higher-Order Set Operations and Termination
A few comments are in order on the termination of the higher-order
functions setfilter, setmap, and setsplit. Consider the expression
setfilter f s for s of type τ set and an arbitrary function f :
τ → bool. If f diverges on some particular input v : τ , then
the presence or absence of v in the set s can make setfilter f s
diverge or terminate. This runs afoul of the claim of Theorem 2.4
that two metrically similar computations should together evaluate
to metrically nearby values.
One way of avoiding this problem is to adopt primitives for
which 2.4 can still be proved: we can ensure dynamically that
the function argument (setfilter, setmap, and setsplit) terminates
by imposing a time limit on the number of steps it can run over
each element of the set. Whenever a function exceeds its time limit
while operating on a set element x, it is left out of the filter or of
the current split as appropriate, and in the case of setmap, a default
element of type τ is used.
An alternative is to weaken Theorem 2.4 to state that if two
computations over metrically related inputs do both terminate, then
their outputs are metrically related. This weakened result is considerably less desirable for our intended application to differential
privacy, however.
A final option is to statically ensure the termination of the
function argument. This seems to combine the best features of
both of the other choices, at the price of a more complex program
analysis.
3.6 Sorting

2 The

reader may note that this primitive is exactly the well-known distributivity property that the BI, the logic of bunched implications [28], notably satisfies in contrast with linear logic. We conjecture that a type system
based on BI might also be suitable for distance-sensitive computations, but
we leave this to future work, because of uncertainties about the decidability of typechecking and BI’s lack of exponentials, that is, operators such
as !, which are important for interactions between distance-sensitive and
-insensitive parts of a program.

What about distance-sensitive sorting? Ordinarily, the basis of sorting functions is a comparison operator such as ≥τ : τ × τ → bool.
However, we cannot take ≥R : R ⊗ R ⊸ bool as a primitive, because ≥ is not 1-sensitive in either of its arguments: it has a glaring
discontinuity. (Compare the example of gtzero in Section 2.1) Although (0, ǫ) and (ǫ, 0) are nearby values in R ⊗ R if ǫ is small
(they are just 2ǫ apart), nonetheless ≥R returns false for one and

true for the other, values of bool that are by definition infinitely far
apart.
Because of this we instead take as a primitive the conditional
swap function cswp : R⊗R ⊸ R⊗R defined in Section 2.1, which
takes in a pair, and outputs the same pair, swapped if necessary
so that the first component is no larger than the second. We are
therefore essentially concerned with sorting networks, [5] with
cswp being the comparator. With the comparator, we can easily
implement a version of insertion sort.
insert : R ⊸ R list ⊸ R list
insert x [ ] = [x]
insert x (h :: tl) = let(a, b) = cswp (x, h) in
a :: (insert b tl)
sort : R list ⊸ R list
sort [ ] = [ ]
sort (h :: tl) = insert h (sort tl)
Of course, the execution time of this sort is Θ(n2 ). It is an
open question whether any of the typical Θ(n log n) sorting algorithms (merge sort, quick sort, heap sort) can be implemented
in our language, but we can implement bitonic sort [5], which is
Θ(n(log n)2 ), and we conjecture that one can implement the logdepth (and therefore Θ(n log n) time) sorting network due to Ajtai,
Komlós, and Szemerédi [2].
3.7 Finite Maps
Related to sets are finite maps from σ to τ , which we write as the
type σ ⇀ τ . A finite map f from σ to τ is an unordered set of
tuples (s, t) where s : σ and t : τ , subject to the constraint that
each key s has at most one value t associated with it: if (s, t) ∈ f
and (s, t′ ) ∈ f , then t = t′ . One can think of finite maps as SQL
databases where one column is distinguished as the primary key.
This type has essentially the same metric as the metric for sets,
dσ⇀τ (S1 , S2 ) = ||S1 △ S2 ||. By isolating the primary key, we
can support some familiar relational algebra operations:
fmsize : (σ ⇀ τ ) ⊸ R
fmfilter : (σ → τ → bool) → (σ ⇀ τ ) ⊸ (σ ⇀ τ )
mapval : (τ1 → τ2 ) → (σ ⇀ τ1 ) ⊸ (σ ⇀ τ2 )
join : (σ ⇀ τ1 ) ⊗ (σ ⇀ τ2 ) ⊸ (σ ⇀ (τ1 ⊗ τ2 ))
The size and filter functions work similar to the corresponding
operations on sets, and there are now two different map operators,
one that operates on keys and one on values. The join operation
takes two maps (i, si )i∈I1 and (i, s′i )i∈I2 , and outputs the map
(i, (s1 , s2 ))i∈I1 ∩I2 . This operation is 1-sensitive in the pair of
input maps, but only because we have identified a unique primary
key for both of them! For comparison, the cartesian product ×
on sets — the operation that join is ordinarily derived from in
relational algebra — is not c-sensitive for any finite c, for we can
see that ({x} ∪ X) × Y has |Y | many more elements than X × Y .
McSherry also noted this issue with unrestricted joins, and deals
with it in a similar way in PINQ [25].
Finally, we are also able to support a form of GroupBy aggregation, in the form of a primitive
group : (τ → σ) → !2 τ set ⊸ (σ ⇀ (τ set))
which takes a key extraction function f : τ → σ, and a set S of
values of type τ , and returns a finite map which maps values y ∈ σ
to the set of s ∈ S such that f (s) = y. This function is 2-sensitive
(thus the !2 ) in the set argument, because the addition or removal
of a single set element may change one element in the output map:
it takes two steps to represent such a change as the removal of the
old mapping, and the insertion of the new one.

4. A Calculus for Differential Privacy
We now describe how to apply the above type system to expressing
differentially private computations. There are two ways to do this.
One is to leverage the fact that our type system captures sensitivity, and use standard results about obtaining differential privacy by
adding noise to c-sensitive functions. Since Theorem 2.4 guarantees that every well-typed expression b :c db ⊢ e : R (for a type
db of databases) is a c-sensitive function db → R, we can apply
Proposition 4.1 below to obtain a differentially private function by
adding the appropriate amount of noise to the function’s result. But
we can do better. In this section, we show how adding a probability
monad to the type theory allows us to directly capture differential
privacy within our language.
4.1 Background
First, we need a few technical preliminaries from the differential
privacy literature [14].
The definition of differential privacy is a property of randomized functions that take as input a database, and return a result,
typically a real number.
For the sake of the current discussion, we take a database to
be a set of ‘rows’, one for each user whose privacy we mean to
protect. The type of one user’s data—that is, of one row of the
database—is written row. For example, row might be the type of
a single patient’s complete medical record. The type of databases
is then db = row set; we use the letter b for elements of this type.
Differential privacy is parametrized by a number ǫ, which controls
how strong the privacy guarantee is: the smaller ǫ is, the more
privacy is guaranteed. It is perhaps just as well to think about ǫ
as a measure rather of how much privacy can be lost by allowing a
query to take place. We assume from now on that we have fixed ǫ
to some particular appropriate value.
Informally, a function is differentially private if it behaves statistically similarly on similar databases, so that any individual’s presence in the database has a statistically negligible effect. Databases
b and b′ are considered similar, written b ∼ b′ if they differ by at
most one row—in other words if ddb (b, b′ ) ≤ 1. The standard definition [15] of differential privacy for functions from databases to
real numbers is as follows:
Definition A random function q : db → R is ǫ-differentially
private if for all S ⊆ R, and for all databases b, b′ with b ∼ b′ ,
we have P r[q(b) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ P r[q(b′ ) ∈ S].
We see that for a differentially private function, when its input
database has one row added or deleted, there can only be a very
small multiplicative difference (eǫ ) in the probability of any outcome S. For example, suppose an individual is concerned about
their data being included in a query to a hospital’s database; perhaps
that the result of that query might cause them to be denied health
insurance. If we require that query to be 0.1-differentially private
(i.e., if ǫ is set to 0.1), then they can be reassured that the chance
of them being denied health care can only increase by about 10%.
(Note that this is a 10% increase relative to what the probability
would have been without the patient’s participation in the database.
If the probability without the patient’s data being included was 5%,
then including the data raises it at most to 5.5%, not to 15%!)
It is straightforward to generalize this definition to other types,
by using the distance between two inputs instead of the database
similarity condition. We say:
Definition A random function q : τ → σ is ǫ-differentially private
if for all S ⊆ σ, and for all v, v ′ : τ , have P r[q(v) ∈ S] ≤
′
eǫdτ (v,v ) P r[q(v ′ ) ∈ S].
Although we will use this general definition below in Lemma 4.2,
for the time being we continue considering only functions db → R.

One way to achieve differential privacy is via the Laplace mechanism. We suppose we have a deterministic database query, a function f : db → R of known sensitivity, and we produce a differentially private function by adding Laplace-distributed noise to the
result of f . The Laplace distribution Lk is parametrized by k—
intuitively, a measure of the spread, or ‘amount’, of noise to be
1 −|x|/k
e
.
added. It has the probability density function P r[x] = 2k
The Laplace distribution is symmetric and centered around zero,
and its probabilities fall off exponentially as one moves away from
zero. It is a reasonable noise distribution, which is unlikely to
yield values extremely far from zero. The intended behavior of the
Laplace mechanism is captured by the following result:
P ROPOSITION 4.1 ([15]). Suppose f : db → R is c-sensitive.
Define the random function q : db → R by q = λb.f (b) + N ,
where N is a random variable distributed according to Lc/ǫ . Then
q is ǫ-differentially private.
That is, the amount of noise required to make a c-sensitive function
ǫ-private is c/ǫ. Stronger privacy requirements (smaller ǫ) and more
sensitive functions (larger c) both require more noise.
Note that we must impose a global limit on how many queries
can be asked of the same database: if we could ask the same query
over and over again, we could eventually learn the true value of f
with high probability despite the noise. If we exhaust the “privacy
budget” for a given database, the database must be destroyed. This
data-consuming aspect of differentially private queries was the
initial intuition that guided us to the linear-logic-inspired design
of the type system.
4.2 The Probability Monad
We now show how to extend our language with a monad of random
computations. Formally, the required extensions to the syntax are:
Types τ
Expressions e
Values v

::=
::=
::=

· · · | #τ
· · · | return x | let #x = e in e′
··· | δ

We add #τ , the type of random computations over τ . Expressions now include a monadic return, which deterministically always yields x, as well as monadic sequencing: the expression
let #x = e in e′ can be interpreted as drawing a sample x from
the random computation e, and then continuing with the computation e′ . We postpone discussing the typing rules until after we
have established what the metric on #τ is, and for that we need to
understand what its values are.
For simplicity, we follow Ramsey and Pfeiffer [30] in taking
a rather denotational approach, and think of values of type #τ
as literally being mathematical probability distributions. A more
strictly syntactic presentation (in terms of, say, pseudo-random
number generators) certainly is also possible, but is needlessly
technical for our present discussion. In what follows, a probability
distribution δ is written as (pi , vi )i∈I , a multiset of probabilityvalue pairs. We write δ(v) for the probability ((pi , vi )i∈I )(v) =
P
{i | vi =v} pi of observing v in the distribution δ.
The metric on probability distributions is carefully chosen to
allow our type system to speak about differential privacy. Recall
that we have assumed ǫ to be fixed, and define:
˛ „
„
«˛«
˛
δ1 (x) ˛˛
1
max ˛˛ln
d#τ (δ1 , δ2 ) =
ǫ x∈τ
δ2 (x) ˛

The typing rules for the monad are as follows:
Γ⊢e:τ

∆ ⊢ e : #τ

Γ, x :∞ τ ⊢ e′ : #τ ′

#I
∞Γ ⊢ return e : #τ

∆ + Γ ⊢ let #x = e in e′ : #τ ′

#E

The introduction rule multiplies the context by infinity, because
nearby inputs (perhaps surprisingly!) do not lead to nearby deterministic probability distributions. Even if t and t′ are close, say
dτ (t, t′ ) = ǫ, still return t has a 100% chance — and return t′
has a 0% chance — of yielding t. The elimination rule adds together the influence ∆ that e may have over the final output distribution to the influence Γ that e′ has, and provides the variable x
unrestrictedly (with annotation ∞) to e′ , because once a differentially private query is made, the published result can be used in any
way at all.
We add the following cases to the operational semantics:
e ֒→ v
return e ֒→ (1, v)
e1 ֒→ (pi , vi )i∈I

∀i ∈ I. [vi /x]e2 ֒→ (qij , wij )j∈Ji

let #x = e1 in e2 ֒→ (pi qij , wij )i∈I,j∈Ji
We see that return creates the trivial distribution that always
yields v. Monadic sequencing considers all possible values vi that
e could evaluate to, and then subsequently all the values that e′
could evaluate to, assuming that it received the sample vi . The
probabilities of these two steps are multiplied, and appropriately
aggregated together.
Combining the type system’s metric preservation property with
Lemma 4.2, we find that typing guarantees differential privacy:
C OROLLARY 4.3. The execution of any closed program e such that
⊢ e : !n τ ⊸ #σ is an (nǫ)-differentially private function from τ
to σ.

5. Differential Privacy Examples
Easy examples of ǫ-differentially private computations come from
applying the Laplace mechanism at the end of a deterministic
computation. We can add a primitive function
add noise : R ⊸ #R
which adds Laplace noise L1/ǫ to its input. According to Proposition 4.1, this is exactly the right amount of noise to add to a 1sensitive function to make it ǫ-differentially private.
For a concrete example, suppose that we have a function age :
row → int. We can then straightforwardly implement the over-40
count query from the introduction.
over 40 : row → bool.
over 40 r = age r > 40.
count query : row set ⊸ #R
count query b = add noise (setfilter over 40 b)

The definition measures how multiplicatively far apart two distributions are in the worst case, as is required by differential privacy.
We can then easily see by unrolling definitions that

Notice that we are able to use convenient higher-order functional
programming idioms without any difficulty. The function over 40
is also an example of how ‘ordinary programming’ can safely
be mixed in with distance-sensitive programs. Since the type of
over 40 uses → rather than ⊸, it makes no promise about sensitivity, and it is able to use ‘discontinuous’ operations like numeric
comparison >.
Other deterministic queries can be turned into differentially private functions in a similar way. For example, consider the histogram function hist : R set ⊸ R list from Section 3.4. We can
first of all write the following program.

L EMMA 4.2. A 1-sensitive function τ → #σ is the same thing as
an ǫ-differentially private random function τ → σ.

hist query′ : row set ⊸ (#R) list
hist query′ b = map add noise (hist (setmap age b))

This takes a database, finds the age of every individual, and computes a histogram of the ages. Then we prescribe that each item in
the output list — every bucket in the histogram — should be independently noised. This yields a list of random computations, while
what we ultimately want is a random computation returning a list.
But we can use monadic sequencing to get exactly this:
seq : (#R) list ⊸ #(R list)
seq [] = return []
seq (h :: tl) = let #h′ = h in
let #tl′ = seq tl in
return(h′ :: tl′ )
hist query : row set ⊸ #(R list)
hist query b = seq (hist query′ b)
In the differential privacy literature, there are explicit definitions of
both the meaning of sensitivity and the process of safely adding
enough noise to lists of real numbers [15]. By contrast, we have
shown how to derive these concepts from the primitive metric type
R and the type operators µ, 1, +, ⊗, and #.
We can also derive more complex combinators on differentially
private computations, merely by programming with the monad.
We consider first a simple version3 of McSherry’s principle of
sequential composition [25].
L EMMA 5.1 (Sequential Composition). Let f1 and f2 be two ǫdifferentially private queries, where f2 is allowed to depend on
the output of f1 . Then the result of performing both queries is 2ǫdifferentially private.
In short, the privacy losses of consecutive queries are added together. This principle can be embodied as the following higherorder function:
sc : (τ1 ⊸ #τ2 ) → (τ1 ⊸ τ2 → #τ3 ) → (!2 τ1 ⊸ #τ3 )
sc f1 f2 t1 = let !t′1 = t1 in let #t2 = f1 t′1 in f2 t′1 t2
It takes two arguments are the functions f1 and f2 , which are
both ǫ-differentially private in a data source of type τ1 (and f2
additionally has unrestricted access to the τ2 result of f1 ), and
returns a 2ǫ-differentially private computation.
McSherry also identifies a principle of parallel composition:
L EMMA 5.2 (Parallel Composition). Let f1 and f2 be two ǫdifferentially private queries, which depend on disjoint data. Then
the result of performing both queries is ǫ-differentially private.
This can be coded up by interpreting “disjoint” with ⊗.
pc : (τ1 ⊸ #τ2 ) → (σ1 ⊸ #σ2 ) → (τ1 ⊗ σ1 ) ⊸ #(τ2 ⊗ σ2 )
pc f g (t, s) = let #t′ = f t in let #s′ = g s in return(t′ , s′ )

In McSherry’s work, what is literally meant by “disjoint” is disjoint
subsets of a database construed as a set of records. This is also
possible to treat in our setting, since we have already seen that split
returns a ⊗-pair of two sets.
For a final, slightly more complex example, let us consider the
privacy-preserving implementation of k-means by Blum et al. [6].
Recall that k-means is a simple clustering algorithm, which works
as follows. We assume we have a large set of data points in some
space (say Rn ), and we want to find k ‘centers’ around which they
cluster. We initialize k provisional ‘centers’ to random points in the
space, and iteratively try to improve these guesses. One iteration
consists of grouping each data point with the center it is closest to,
then taking the next round’s set of k centers to be the mean of each
group.
3 McSherry

actually states a stronger principle, where there are k different
queries, all of different privacy levels. This can also be implemented in our
language.

We sketch how this program can be implemented, taking data
points to be of the type pt = R⊗R. The following helper functions
are used:
assign : pt list → pt set ⊸ (pt ⊗ int) set
partition : (pt ⊗ int) set ⊸ pt set list
totx, toty : pt set ⊸ R
zip : τ list → σ list → (τ ⊗ σ) list
These can be written with the
primitives we have described;
assign takes a list of centers and
the dataset, and returns a version
of the dataset where each point is
labelled by the index of the center
it’s closest to. Then partition divides this up into a list of sets, using split. The functions totx and
toty compute the sum of the first
and second coordinates, respectively, of each point in a set. This
Figure 4. k-Means Output
can be accomplished with sum.
Finally, zip is the usual zipping operation that combines two lists
into a list of pairs. With these, we can write a function that performs
one iteration of private k-means:
means

iterate : !3 pt set ⊸ R list → #(R list)
iterate b ms = let !b′ = b in
let
b′′ = partition (assign ms b′ )
tx = map (add noise ◦ totx) b′′
ty = map (add noise ◦ toty) b′′
t = map (add noise ◦ size) b′′
stats = zip (zip (tx, ty), t)
in
seq (map avg stats)
It works by asking for noisy sums of the x-coordinate total, ycoordinate total, and total population of each cluster. These data
are then combined via the function avg:
avg : ((#R ⊗ #R) ⊗ #R) ⊸ #(R ⊗ R)
avg ((x, y), t) = let #x′ = x in let #y ′ = y in
let #t′ = t in return (x′ /t′ , y ′ /t′ )
We can read off from the type that one iteration of k-means is 3ǫdifferentially private. This type arises from the 3-way replication of
the variable b′′ . We can use monadic sequencing to do more than
one iteration:
two iters : !6 pt set ⊸ R list → #(R list)
two iters b ms = let !b′ = b in iterate !b′ (iterate !b′ ms)
This function is 6ǫ-differentially private. Figure 4 shows the result
of three independent runs of this code, with k = 2, 6ǫ = 0.05,
and 12,500 points of synthetic data. We see that it usually manages
to come reasonably close to the true center of the two clusters. We
have also developed appropriate additional primitives and programming techniques to make it possible (as one would certainly hope!)
to choose the number of iterations not statically but at runtime, but
space reasons prevent us from discussing them here.

6. Metatheory
In this section we address the formal correctness of the programming language described above. First of all, we can prove appropriate versions of the usual basic properties that we expect to hold
of a well-formed typed programming language.
L EMMA 6.1 (Weakening). If Γ ⊢ e : τ , then Γ + ∆ ⊢ e : τ .

∀v : τ1 .[v/x]e1 ∼r [v/x]e2 : τ2

∀v : τ1 .[v/x]e1 ∼r [v/x]e2 : τ2

λx.e1 ∼r λx.e2 : τ1 → τ2

λx.e1 ∼r λx.e2 : τ1 ⊸ τ2

v1 ∼r1 v1′ : τ1

v2 ∼r2 v2′ : τ2

v ∼r v ′ : τ

(v1 , v2 ) ∼r1 +r2 (v1′ , v2′ ) : τ1 ⊗ τ2
v1 ∼r v1′ : τ1

!v ∼rs !v′ : !s τ

v2 ∼r v2′ : τ2
() ∼r () : 1

hv1 , v2 i ∼r hv1′ , v2′ i : τ1 & τ2
v ∼r v′ : [µα.τ /α]τ

v ∼r v′ : τi

fold v ∼r fold v′ : µα.τ

inji v ∼r inji v′ : τ1 + τ2

∀v1 : τ.e1 ֒→ v1 ⇒ ∃v2 .e2 ֒→ v2 ∧ v1 ∼r v2 : τ
e 1 ∼r e 2 : τ
∀v ∈ τ.δ1 (v) ≤ erǫ δ2 (v)
δ1 ∼r δ2 : #τ

Figure 5. Metric Relation
T HEOREM 6.2 (Substitution). If Γ ⊢ e : τ and ∆, x :r τ ⊢ e′ :
τ ′ , then ∆ + rΓ ⊢ [e/x]e′ : τ ′ .
T HEOREM 6.3 (Preservation). If ⊢ e : τ and e ֒→ v, then ⊢ v : τ .
Note that the weakening lemma allows both making the context
larger, and making the annotations numerically greater. The substitution property says that if we substitute e into a variable that is
used r times, then Γ, the dependencies of e, must be multiplied by
r in the result. The preservation lemma is routine; if we had presented the operational semantics in a small-step style, a progress
theorem would also be easy to show.
6.1 Defining the Metric
Up to now, the metrics on types have been dealt with somewhat
informally; in particular, our ’definition’ of distance for recursive
types was not well founded. We now describe a formal definition.
It is convenient to treat the metric not as a function, but rather as a
relation on values and expressions. The relation v ∼r v ′ : τ (resp.
e ∼r e′ : τ ) means that values v and v ′ (expressions e and e′ ) of
type τ are at a distance of no more than r apart from each other. The
metric on expressions is defined by evaluation: if the values that
result from evaluation of the two expressions are no farther than
r apart, then the two expressions are considered to be no farther
than r apart. This relation is defined coinductively on the rules in
Figure 5. By this we mean that we define v ∼r v ′ : τ to be the
greatest relation consistent with the given rules. A relation is said
to be consistent with a set of inference rules if for any relational
fact that holds, there exists an inference rule whose conclusion
is that fact, and all premises of that rule belong to the relation.
Intuitively, this means that we allow infinitely deep inference trees.
Note that ∼r never appears negatively (i.e., negated or to the left
of an implication) in the premise of any rule, so we can see that
closure under the rules is a property preserved by arbitrary union
of relations, and therefore the definition is well-formed.

in Γ, written [v1 /x1 ] · · · [vn /xn ]. A distance vector γ is a list
r1 , . . . , rn such that every ri is in R≥0 ∪ ∞. We say σ ∼γ σ ′ : Γ
when, for every [vi /xi ] ∈ σ and [vi′ /xi ] ∈ σ ′ , we have vi ∼ri
vi′ : τi . In this case we think of σ and σ ′ as being ‘γ apart’: the
distance vector γ tracks the distance between each corresponding
pair of values. We define the dot product of a distance vector and
a contextPas follows: if γ is r1 , . . . , rn , and Γ is as above, then
γ·Γ= n
i=1 ri si .
T HEOREM 6.4 (Metric Preservation). Suppose Γ ⊢ e : τ . Suppose σ, σ ′ are two substitutions for Γ such that σ ∼γ σ ′ : Γ. Then
we have σe ∼γ·Γ σ ′ e : τ .

A straightforward proof attempt of this theorem fails. If we try
to split cases by the typing derivation of e, a problem arises at the
case where e = e1 e2 . The induction hypothesis will tell us that
σe1 is close to σ ′ e1 , and that σe2 is close to σ ′ e2 . But the definition
of the metric at function types (whether → or ⊸ — the problem
arises for both of them) only quantifies over one value — how then
can we reason about both σe2 and σ ′ e2 ? This problem is solved by
using a step-indexed metric logical relation [1, 3] which represents
a stronger induction hypothesis, but which agrees with the metric.
We defer further details of this argument to the appendix.

7. Related Work
The seminal paper on differential privacy is [15]; it introduces the
fundamental definition and the Laplace mechanism. More general
mechanisms for directly noising types other than R also exist,
such as the exponential mechanism [24], and techniques have been
developed to reduce the amount of noise required for repeated
queries, such as the median mechanism [31]. Dwork [13] gives a
useful survey of recent results.
Girard’s linear logic [16] was a turning point in a long and
fruitful history of investigation of substructural logics, which lack
structural properties such as unrestricted weakening and contraction. A key feature of linear logic compared to earlier substructural
logics [20] is its ! operator, which bridges linear and ordinary reasoning. Our type system takes its structure from the affine variant
of linear logic (also related to Ketonen’s Direct Logic [19]), where
weakening is permitted. The idea of counting, as we do, multiple
uses of the same resource was explored by Wright [32], but only
integral numbers of uses were considered.
The study of database privacy and statistical databases more
generally has a long history. Recent work includes Dalvi, Ré, and
Suciu’s study of probabilistic database management systems [11],
and Machanavajjhala et al.’s comparison of different notions of
privacy with respect to real-world census data [22].
Quantitative Information Flow [21, 23] is, like our work, concerned with how much one piece of a program can affect another,
but measures this in terms of how many bits of entropy leak during
one execution. Provenance analysis [8] in databases tracks the input
data actually used to compute a query’s output, and is also capable
of detecting that the same piece of data was used multiple times to
produce a given answer [17]. Chaudhuri et al. [10] also study automatic program analyses that establish continuity (in the traditional
topological sense) of numerical programs. Our approach differs in
two important ways. First, we consider the stronger property of csensitivity, which is essential for differential privacy applications.
Second, we achieve our results with a logically motivated type system, rather than a program analysis.

6.2 Metric Preservation Theorem
Now we can state the central novel property that our type system
guarantees. We introduce some notation to make the statement
more compact. Suppose Γ = x :s1 τ1 , . . . x :sn τn . A substitution
σ for Γ is a list of individual substitutions of values for variables

8. Conclusion
We have presented a typed functional programming language that
guarantees differential privacy. It is expressive enough to encode
examples both from the differential privacy community and from

functional programming practice. Its type system shows how differential privacy arises conceptually from the combination of sensitivity analysis and monadic encapsulation of random computations.
There remains a rich frontier of differentially private mechanisms and algorithms that are known, but which are described and
proven correct individually. We expect that the exponential mechanism should be easy to incorporate into our language, as a higherorder primitive which directly converts McSherry and Talwar’s notion of quality functions [24] into probability distributions. The median mechanism, whose analysis is considerably more complicated,
is likely to be more of a challenge. The private combinatorial optimization algorithms developed by Gupta et al. [18] use different
definitions of differential privacy which have an additive error term;
we conjecture this could be captured by varying the notion of sensitivity to include additive slack. We believe that streaming private
counter of Chan et al. [9] admits an easy implementation by coding
up stream types in the usual way. We hope to show in future work
how these, and other algorithms can be programmed in a uniform,
privacy-safe language.
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Proof By induction.
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e1 ֒→ (pi , vi )i∈I

∀i ∈ I. [vi /x]e2 ֒→ (qij , wij )j∈Ji

let #x = e1 in e2

ℓ+mini mi

֒→

A.3 Fundamental Lemma of Logical Relations
The usual fundamental lemma to show for a logical relation is
a form of reflexivity: that every expression is related to itself,
assuming everything in its context is related to itself. We must
generalize this to account for the metric, but the required lemma
is essentially identical to the metric preservation lemma we have
already discussed. The only novelty is that both the premise and
conclusion are indexed by a step-index k.

let !x = e in e ֒→ v′

!e ֒→ !v

τ

e ֒→ v

′ ℓ+m

ℓ

unfold e ֒→ v

ℓ

m

[v/x]ei ֒→ v′

e ֒→ inji v

L EMMA A.1 (Monotonicity). Suppose v1 ∼kr v2 : τ .
′
If k′ ≤ k, then v1 ∼kr v2 : τ .
′
k
If r ≥ r, then v1 ∼r′ v2 : τ .

e ֒→ hv1 , v2 i

let(x, y) = e in e′ ֒→ v′
e ֒→ v

e2 ֒→ v2
ℓ+m

he1 , e2 i ֒→ hv1 , v2 i
ℓ

m

e1 ֒→ v1

e2 ֒→ v2

e ֒→ (v1 , v2 )

() ֒→ ()

v′

refute the possibility that values v1 and v2 are at least as close as
distance r. It is defined by the rules in Figure ??. This relation is
connected to the metric by the fact that v1 ∼r v2 : τ holds if
v1 ∼kr v2 : τ holds for all k; this is proved in Section ??.
A basic property of the logical relation, which helps form an
intuition for it, is the fact that it is preserved by decreasing k, and
by increasing r. Formally, we have:

(pi qij , wij )i∈I,j∈Ji

ℓ

e ֒→ v

L EMMA A.2 (Fundamental Lemma). Let a well-typed expression
Γ ⊢ e : τ be given. Suppose σ, σ ′ are two substitutions for Γ such
that σ ∼kγ σ ′ : Γ. Then we have σe ∼kγ·Γ σ ′ e : τ .

ℓ

return e ֒→ (1, v)

Figure 6. Step-Indexed Evaluation Rules

Proof By induction first on the number of steps k, then on the
typing derivation of e. We split cases on the typing derivation of
e. We show a couple of illustrative cases as examples.

A. Appendix
In this section we sketch in somewhat more detail the proof of the
central novel soundness property of our type system.
At a high level, the proof works in two steps. First, we relate the
metric as defined above to a step-indexed metric logical relation
which, as we will see, determines the same metric, but in a way
that constitutes a stronger induction hypothesis. Subsequently, we
can prove a metric preservation theorem directly on the logical
relation. The fact that the logical relation is step-indexed means
that we imagine we have a finite budget of ‘computation steps’ with
which to discriminate between similar expressions. This notion of
‘computation step’ is made precise in the following section.

Case:
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ ⊸ τ ′

Γ + ∆ ⊢ e1 e2 : τ ′
In this case, we want to show:

⊸E

j

∀v.∀j < k. σ(e1 e2 ) ֒→ v ⇒ ∃v ′ .σ ′ (e1 e2 ) ֒→ v ′
′
v ∼k−j
γ·(Γ+∆) v : τ

∧

j

Let v and j < k be given, and assume σ(e1 e2 ) ֒→ v. This
means we have a derivation
p

m

ℓ

σe2 ֒→ v2

σe1 ֒→ λx.e0

A.1 Step-Indexed Evaluation

∆ ⊢ e2 : τ

ℓ+m+p

[v2 /x]e0 ֒→ v

The purpose of step-indexing (at least for our purposes) is to accommodate the presence of nontermination in the language, which
in turn can be blamed on the presence of recursive types. Because
of this, we consider as computation steps the β-reductions of a fold
against an unfold; that is, from a small-step point of view, we care
about reductions of the form

such that ℓ + m + p = j.
By the induction hypothesis on ∆ ⊢ e2 : τ , we know that

unfold fold v 7→ v

∧

σ(e1 e2 )

ℓ

ational semantics: e ֒→ v means that e evaluates to v, and during
that evaluation, the number of reductions of the form (†) is ℓ. The
rules are given in Figure.??. Observe that the rule that evaluates a
unfold adds one to the count, and all other rules simply add together the counts from their subderivations, if any.

v

j∗

∀v∗ .∀j∗ < k. σe2 ֒→ v∗ ⇒ ∃v2′ .σ ′ e2 ֒→ v2′

(†)

But we can count such reductions in big-step style without much
difficulty. We give a step-indexed refinement of the existing oper-

֒→

′
∗
v∗ ∼k−j
γ·∆ v2 : τ
m

so pick v∗ = v2 and j∗ = m, and use the fact that σe2 ֒→ v2 to
obtain v2′ . What we know about v2′ at present is that σ ′ e2 ֒→ v2′
and v2 ∼k−m
v2′ : τ . Using monotonicity, this latter fact
γ·∆
becomes:
v2 ∼k−ℓ−m
v2′ : τ
(∗)
γ·∆
By the induction hypothesis on Γ ⊢ e1 : τ ⊸ τ ′ , we know that
j∗

A.2 Step-Indexed Metric Logical Relation
Now we introduce the step-indexed metric logical relation. The
relation v1 ∼kr v2 : τ is conceptually a variant of v1 ∼r v2 : τ . It
means approximately the following: that after k computation steps,
(in the sense we have just described) there is still no evidence to

∀v∗ .∀j∗ < k. σe1 ֒→ v∗ ⇒ ∃v• .σ ′ e1 ֒→ v•
∧

∗
v∗ ∼k−j
v• : τ ⊸ τ ′
γ·Γ

ℓ

so pick v∗ = λx.e0 and j∗ = ℓ and use the fact that σe1 ֒→
λx.e0 to obtain v• . By inversion on the rules defining ∼, we

v1 ∼kr1 v1′ : τ1

∀s:R≥0 ∪ {∞}.∀j ≤ k.∀v1 , v2 : τ1 .v1 ∼js v2 : τ1 ⇒ [v1 /x]e1 ∼jr+s [v2 /x]e2 : τ2

(v1 , v2 ) ∼kr1 +r2 (v1′ , v2′ ) : τ1 ⊗ τ2

λx.e1 ∼kr λx.e2 : τ1 ⊸ τ2
∀s:R≥0 ∪ {∞}.∀j ≤ k.∀v1 , v2 : τ1 .v1 ∼js v2 : τ1 ⇒ [v1 /x]e1 ∼jr+∞s [v2 /x]e2 : τ2

() : 1

∼0r

fold v

fold v ∼k+1
fold v ′ : µα.τ
r

v2 ∼kr v2′ : τ2

v ∼kr v ′ : τi

v ∼kr v ′ : τ

inji v ∼kr inji v ′ : τ1 + τ2

!v ∼krs !v ′ : !s τ

v ∼kr v ′ : [µα.τ /α]τ
()

v1 ∼kr v1′ : τ1

hv1 , v2 i ∼kr hv1′ , v2′ i : τ1 & τ2

λx.e1 ∼kr λx.e2 : τ1 → τ2

∼kr

v2 ∼kr2 v2′ : τ2

′

fold v : µα.τ

j

∀v1 .∀j < k.e1 ֒→ v1 ⇒ ∃v2 .e2 ֒→ v2 ∧ v1 ∼k−j
v2 : τ
r

∀i.xi : τi ∈ Γ ∧ vi ∼kri vi′ : τi

e1 ∼kr e2 : τ

[v1 /x1 ] · · · [vn /xn ] ∼kr1 ,...,rn [v1′ /x1 ] · · · [vn′ /xn ] : Γ
∀v ∈ τ.δ1 (v) ≤ erǫ δ2 (v)
δ1 ∼kr δ2 : #τ
Figure 7. Step-Indexed Metric Logical Relation

have that v• must be of the form λx.e′0 , and so what we know
about it is that σ ′ e1 ֒→ λx.e′0 and
′
′
λx.e0 ∼k−ℓ
γ·Γ λx.e0 : τ ⊸ τ

By inversion on this, we have
∀s.∀j∗ ≤ k − ℓ.

∀v2 , v2′

C OROLLARY A.3. If ⊢ e : τ , then for any k we have e ∼k0 e : τ .
′

:τ .

∗
[v2 /x]e0 ∼jγ·Γ+s

v2 ∼js∗

v2′

[v2′ /x]e′0

:τ ⇒

A.4 Relating the Metric to the Logical Relation

′

:τ
so choose j∗ = k − ℓ − m and s = γ · ∆ and use (∗) to see that
′
′
′
[v2 /x]e0 ∼k−ℓ−m
γ·Γ+γ·∆ [v2 /x]e0 : τ

By inversion on this, we have
j∗

∀v.∀j∗ < k − ℓ − m. [v2 /x]e0 ֒→ v ⇒ ∃v ′ .[v2′ /x]e′0 ֒→ v ′
∧

so choose j∗ = p and apply the known fact that [v2 /x]e0 ֒→ v,
to obtain the required v ′ such that
′
v ∼k−j
γ·(Γ+∆) v : τ

by observing that γ · (Γ + ∆) = γ · Γ + γ · ∆. Note also that
we have established enough facts about evaluation to derive
σe2 ֒→ v2′

[v2′ /x]e′0 ֒→ v ′

σ ′ (e1 e2 ) ֒→ v ′
Case:

To see that the metric coincides with the logical relation, we must
first show that the metric satisfies a variant of the triangle inequality
familiar from the study of metric spaces.
L EMMA A.4 (Triangle Inequality). For any closed, well-typed
values v, v ′ , v ′′ : τ ,
If v ∼r v ′ : τ and v ′ ∼s v ′′ : τ , then v ∼r+s v ′′ : τ .
Proof By induction on the derivation.

k−ℓ−m−j∗ ′
v ∼γ·Γ+γ·∆
v : τ′
p

σe1 ֒→ λx.e′0

As a corollary, we obtain a more familiar result, that every
expression is related to itself at distance zero.

Γ, x :1 τ ⊢ e : τ ′

⊸I
Γ ⊢ λx.e : τ ⊸ τ ′
Let σ, σ ′ be given, and assume σ ∼kγ σ ′ : Γ. We must show
λx.σe ∼kγ·Γ λx.σ ′ e : τ ⊸ τ ′
which means showing that
∀s.∀j ≤ k.∀v1 , v2 : τ. v1 ∼js v2 : τ ⇒
[v1 /x]σe ∼jγΓ+s [v2 /x]σ ′ e : τ ′
by the definition of the logical relation at τ ⊸ τ ′ . But this
follows immediately from the induction hypothesis applied to
the derivation of Γ, x :1 τ ⊢ e : τ ′ and the substitutions
[v1 /x]σ and [v2 /x]σ ′ .

With this in place, we can show the soundness and completeness
of the logical relation with respect to the metric. We assume tacitly
in both of the following results that v, v ′ are closed, well-typed
values of type τ .
L EMMA A.5. If v ∼kr v ′ : τ for all k, then v ∼r v ′ : τ .
L EMMA A.6. If v ∼r v ′ : τ , then v ∼kr v ′ : τ for all k.

